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Abstract 
 
The world has increasingly recognized that private capital has a vital role to play in economic 
development.  African countries have moved to liberalize the investment environment, yet have not 
received much FDI.  At least part of this poor performance is because of lingering skepticism 
toward foreign investment, owing to historical, ideological, and political reasons.  This wariness 
has manifested in many ways, including a range of business environment factors that impede 
greater foreign flows.  Although much of the ideological resistance has faded, a number of specific 
challenges to the purported benefits of FDI have been successful in preventing more active 
liberalization and in moving to deal with indirect barriers. New data from firm surveys in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda suggest that there are important positive effects from FDI for both the host 
economies and the workers in foreign-owned firms.  Based on our three-country sample, foreign 
firms are more productive, bring management skills, invest more heavily in infrastructure and in 
the training and health of their workers, and are more connected to global markets.  At the same 
time, foreign firms do not appear to succeed by grabbing market share and crowding out local 
industry.  These results suggest that many of the common objections to foreign investment are 
exaggerated or false.  Africa, by not attracting more FDI, is therefore failing to fully benefit from 
the potential of foreign capital to contribute to economic development and integration with the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The world has increasingly recognized that private capital has a vital role to play in economic 
development. The UN’s Millennium Declaration explicitly calls for greater foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to Africa. Over the course of the 1990s, African countries significantly 
liberalized the environment for foreign investment.  Nearly all countries revised their 
national laws governing FDI and the vast majority lifted controls on capital (UNCTAD, 
1998). 
 
Despite these substantial changes, Africa has not received the levels of FDI that had been 
expected by reformers.  At the same time, there remains a deeply-rooted skepticism within 
Africa toward foreign investment, owing to historical, ideological, and political reasons.   
These sentiments have manifested themselves through a range of barriers to foreign 
investment, including nationalization of foreign firms, heavy state intervention in the 
economy, direct legal restrictions on foreign investment, and a host of indirect barriers.   
Some of the early ideological objections to foreign capital have eroded over time and most of 
the legal restrictions have been removed as countries have pursued economic policy reforms 
over the past two decades.  Nevertheless, some constraints remain in place and many of the 
indirect barriers remain significant obstacles to higher flows to the continent.   
 
At least part of the lingering anti-foreign capital climate is rooted in specific concerns that 
purported benefits of foreign investment are not being realized.  This paper outlines the 
context of Africa’s view of foreign capital and then uses new data from firm surveys 
conducted in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as part of the World Bank’s Regional Program 
on Enterprise Development (RPED) to assess some of these specific concerns about the 
effects of FDI in poor countries. 
 
2.  Foreign Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The literature on the effects of FDI in developing countries lists a range of prospective 
benefits to the recipient country.  At the macroeconomic level, FDI by definition brings new 
capital for investment, contributing to the balance of payments, adding to the country’s 
capital stock, and potentially adding to future economic growth.  FDI is also cited as a more 
stable type of capital flow, and thus is arguably more appropriate and development-friendly 
for low-income countries than portfolio flows.  There is also some evidence that foreign 
investment can contribute to raising exports and integrating into global economic networks.  
At the microeconomic level there are also a range of purported benefits, especially higher 
productivity through new investment in physical and human capital, increased employment, 
enhanced management, and the transfer of technology.  Foreign investment also is thought to 
have important spillover effects on local firms through supply and distribution chains, 
trading, and outsourcing (see among many, e.g., Blomström and Kokko, 1997 and 1998; 
Markusen and Venables, 1997). 
 
Partly as a result of the growing recognition that FDI can play an important role in economic 
growth and development, low-income countries have increasingly engaged in competition to 
attract foreign investment.  Most low-income countries have undergone some types of policy 
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reform designed to reduce barriers and attract investment and most also now have some 
explicit kind of investment promotion agency.  Because a range of studies looking at 
determinants of FDI has pointed to the business environment as a key factor (e.g. 
Goldsborough et al, 1996; MIGA, 2002; on Africa specifically see Morisset, 2000; Pigato, 
2002; Asiedu, 2003a), countries have typically undertaken to move toward macroeconomic 
stability, enhanced contract enforcement, and other measures thought to be investment-
friendly.  
 
Africa has also been part of this trend.  Many countries have taken steps to liberalize the 
environment for FDI, gradually allowing foreign investors to operate in increasing types of 
sectors.  Indeed, whereas countries used to list those specific sectors open to foreigner 
investment, the norm is now to assume a legally open regime with restricted sectors listed as 
the exceptions.  There have also been some policies actively designed to attract investment, 
such as tax holidays, easing of import and customs controls, infrastructure investment, and 
labor law reform.   
 
The response to Africa’s investment policy changes has been mixed.  Inward FDI to Africa 
has been marked by three general trends over the past three decades.  First, levels have 
generally increased over time in nominal absolute terms.  Average annual flows in the 1970s 
to sub-Saharan Africa averaged just $907 million.  In the 1980s, this figure rose only slightly 
to $1.3 billion, but jumped to $4.3 billion in the 1990s.  In the most recent three years (2000-
02), the average inward FDI to sub-Saharan Africa has more than doubled again to $9.3 
billion per year. 
 
Despite these increases, total world FDI has grown much faster.  As a result, Africa’s relative 
share of global FDI, which averaged around 5 percent in the early 1970s, fell to 1-2 percent 
by the early 1980s—and has not recovered above this level (see Figure 1).  This loss in FDI 
share has coincided with other developing regions attracting much higher levels of FDI, also 
pushing down Africa’s relative share.  Africa’s proportion of all FDI to developing countries 
has followed a similar trend, plummeting in the late 1970s from above 20 percent to around 5 
percent and hovering near or below that level for the past two decades.  In 2002, it was still 5 
percent. 
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Figure 1:  FDI to Africa
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Source: UNCTAD FDI database 
 
 
The third trend is strong concentration in a few countries.  In the most recent 5-year period, 
just three countries (South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria) accounted for 55 percent of the total 
(Table 1).  The top fifth (10 out of 48 countries) account for 80 percent, and the bottom half 
account for less than 5 percent.  This trend has held for at least the last three decades, with 
the top 10 countries accounting for more than 75 percent of the continent’s total FDI inflows.  
Additionally, there has been a long-standing concentration in the extractive sectors, 
particularly petroleum.  Nearly all of the investment going to Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial 
Guinea, Sudan, and Chad is oil-related, with the bulk of the investment in the former three 
invested in offshore facilities.  In the most recent 5-year period, these five countries 
accounted for 43.5 percent of Africa’s total FDI (roughly matching oil-concentration in 
previous periods).  In addition, much of the foreign investment in Ghana, Zambia, Namibia, 
Botswana, and South Africa, and more recently Tanzania, has been in large mining projects. 
 
                                                 
2 These figures are based on totaling 48 Sub-Saharan Africa country figures and thus are not the same as 
UNCTAD’s reported “Africa” aggregate total, which includes North African countries.  Sudan is considered 
here to be sub-Saharan. 
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Table 1:  Inward FDI: Sub-Saharan Africa, 1998-2002 
(Average annual) 
 
Rank    Net flows ($m)   percent SSA totalCumulative % 
1   South Africa  2099  24.1  24.1 
2   Angola  1584  18.2  42.4 
3   Nigeria  1074  12.4  54.7 
4   Sudan  478  5.5  60.2 
5   Equatorial Guinea  384  4.4  64.6 
6   Tanzania  344  4.0  68.6 
7   Mozambique  283  3.3  71.8 
8   Chad  266  3.1  74.9 
9   Côte d'Ivoire  260  3.0  77.9 
10   Uganda  238  2.7  80.6 
--        
21   Kenya  62  0.7  95.0 
22-48   Bottom 27 countries  433  5.0  100.0 
 
Bold is mainly oil-related; Chad data is based on 4-year average because of missing data for 2001. 
Source:  UNCTAD FDI Database, author’s calculations 
 
For our purposes here, the oil and mining investment concentration is relevant in two ways.  
A large portion of FDI to Africa has been in enclave projects, which may limit their 
integration with local firms and the local economy. At the same time, this isolation means 
these projects are typically better able to avoid some of the barriers to foreign investment, 
especially security issues or infrastructure weaknesses.   The large size of foreign oil and 
mining firms also means that they are often able to negotiate directly with the government, 
and thus may be able to avoid bureaucratic bottlenecks or other regulations that might affect 
smaller enterprises or those integrated into the local economy.  This suggests that non-
extractive FDI, especially those in smaller firms in manufacturing or services face a very 
different environment. 
 
3.  African skepticism toward foreign investment  
 
Despite the growing competition for FDI and Africa’s ability to attract only modest amounts 
outside of the extractive industries, the continent still has a strong historical skepticism 
toward foreign capital.  Much of the prevailing attitude toward foreign investment is rooted 
in history, ideology, and the politics of the post-independence period.  There is also a set of 
specific concerns that the benefits to FDI are not forthcoming and that certain kinds of 
government intervention are necessary to correct market failures.  This discussion will lead 
directly to some of the outcomes of these attitudes—the direct and indirect barriers to FDI—
in the following section.   
 
Africa’s early experiences with foreign companies continue to affect official and public 
perceptions of FDI.  The arrival of European capitalism in West Africa, first by the 
  5 
 
Portuguese in the 15
th century, and later by the Dutch, French and British, is indelibly linked 
in the public mind to the slave trade and as a precursor for colonialism.  The use of European 
companies as proxies for the sovereign has helped to link in the public’s mind international 
business with imperial expansion.  In 1652 Jan van Riebeeck arrived in the Cape on behalf of 
the Dutch East India Company.  In the late 19
th century, Cecil Rhodes claimed swathes of 
southern Africa on behalf of the British South Africa Company.  Through the company, 
Rhodes secured mining concessions in gold, copper, and diamonds, playing the dual roles of 
entrepreneur and representative of the British crown.  Harsh conditions and treatment of 
laborers added to the linking of foreign companies and exploitation, such as in the mines 
(e.g., under the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association) or plantations (see e.g., 
Hochschild, 1999 for conditions on rubber plantations in the Belgian Congo).  As with the 
United Fruit Company in Latin America, foreign companies in Africa are frequently thought 
of as agents of imperialism and exploitation.   
 
Although the colonial period ended more than a generation ago, it has also remained a central 
factor in Africa’s skepticism over joining the global economy.  Reflecting a common 
sentiment even today, Zambia’s leading daily recently editorialized:  
 
Since when has global capitalism been concerned about equality, fairness and 
genuine justice or the lives of those it affected? From the days of mercantile 
capitalism and its slave trade, through classical colonialism with its crude 
extraction of raw materials from our countries, to today's neo-colonialism the 
situation of our people is basically or fundamentally the same—marginalised, 
exploited, ignorant, diseased, hungry and generally poor (The Post, April 26, 
2003) 
 
Second, perhaps just an importantly, most of Africa’s anti-colonial movements were heavily 
supported by the Soviet Union and its satellites.  This encouraged the popularity of socialism 
and an ideological bias against foreign (or, more specifically, Western) capital.  This was 
closely complemented by dependency theory, which argued that capitalism in general, and 
foreign companies in particular, were agents of underdevelopment and merely continuing 
colonialism in another guise (Leys, 1975; Senghaas-Knobloch, 1975; Rodney, 1981).   
Although dependency theory has been widely discredited, it continues to flourish among 
certain academic circles, many NGOs, and in some political circles today and contributes to 
the current climate of distrust of foreign investors.   
 
Although there has been substantial turnover of political leadership in Africa over the past 
decade, many of the current decision-makers (including those frequently hailed as reformers) 
have held political positions for decades and were trained on the socialist model steeped in 
anti-foreign investment ideology.  Indeed, nearly every African leader, no matter how liberal 
he is considered today, began his career as a socialist or Marxist.  Even as most of Africa’s 
finance ministers have become increasingly convinced that economic openness can be 
beneficial for their countries and fluent in the language of international capitalism, many of 
their cabinet colleagues remain unreconstructed economic nationalists.  Some of the 
ideological opposition to foreign investment is part of a general critique of capitalism—and 
more recently of globalization—and foreign capital remains an easy target.   
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Third, ideas of economic nationalism affected sentiment towards foreign investment, and 
they continue to influence policy today.  Kenneth Kaunda’s “political independence is 
meaningless without economic independence,” shaped not only Zambian investment policy 
but also those of his entire generation of leaders (Tangri, 1999; see also Kaunda, 1979).  
Botswana, one of the African countries that has pursued more orthodox economic policies, 
has not been immune.  Kenneth Koma, leader of the opposition, recently cautioned against 
privatization because, "…lack of managerial skills and capital among Batswana will lead to a 
situation where the economy will be in the hands of foreigners which will ultimately impact 
on the policy of the country…It is like a man who marries a rich woman. He will lose control 
over the affairs of his house" (quoted in Mmegi, March 5, 2000). 
 
On the one hand leaders frequently sought a symbolic break with foreign players that were 
closely identified with colonialism or external control.  On a more practical level, political 
elites also did not want to be constrained by foreigners who might control key strategic 
sectors of the economy or their access to foreign exchange.  Although FDI may be 
considered more stable than other types of capital flows, the flip-side is that foreign investors 
with a greater stake in the long-term might be more inclined to get involved in influencing 
policy or, in the extreme, supporting opposition political groups.
3  
 
Tangri (1999), aptly summarizes the political underpinnings:   
 
Strong feelings of ‘economic nationalism’ stemmed from the weakness and 
subordinate status of African private enterprise as well as from the fact that 
African economies at independence were largely in the hands of foreigners.  
Public sector enterprise was seen as enabling the state to carry out the 
activities that African private entrepreneurs could not perform and also to 
reduce the dominance of foreign enterprise.  Throughout the continent, 
political leaders sought to secure greater indigenous ownership of the 
economy, especially of the activities a country depended on for its foreign-
exchange earnings.  They also sought to achieve greater local control of the 
economy, particularly to ensure that economic decisions were consonant with 
governmental interests.  Foreign economic control posed constraints on state 
personnel exercising decisions affecting the economy; it also made the 
possibility of foreigners intervening in domestic politics much more likely.  
On nationalistic and political grounds, therefore, government leaders desired 
economic independence (pp 19-20). 
 
Fourth, many of the purported benefits of FDI are frequently challenged directly, both on 
ideological and empirical grounds.  There is a common critique that foreign investors crowd 
out local firms that cannot compete because of size, financing, marketing power, or some 
                                                 
3 Tangri (1992) shows that this dynamic could under certain circumstances work in the opposite way.  Under 
Jerry Rawlings (1981-2000), the government in Ghana was less suspicious of foreign business than it was of 
domestic business, which had been closely aligned with the main opposition party.  Despite Rawlings’ populist 
streak, his policies were an example of bias toward foreign investors over local ones as the former were seen as 
less likely to be involved in domestic politics.  
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other unfair advantage (Dunning, 1993; ActionAid, 2003).  The government-owned Times of 
Zambia, for example, recently argued, “The uneven playing field has led to local industry 
and products failing to compete effectively …there are far too many cases of investors 
coming into the country and divert into ventures that should be best left to the locals.…It is 
such issues that investment legislation needs to address” (March 4, 2004).   
 
There are complaints that foreign firms merely exploit local labor and make no contribution 
to the wider economy, either through creating jobs, training workers, or in using local 
suppliers (Oxfam, 2003b).  A frequent grievance against foreign investment is that, although 
the theory suggests capital inflows, in practice FDI can be a drain on foreign exchange.   This 
is because foreign firms may be more likely to import materials (Chudnovsky and Lopez, 
2000) and that foreign firms may remit profits (Oxfam, 2003a).  More broadly, there is 
considerable concern that the interests of foreign firms will diverge from social development 
objectives or constrain governments’ ability to promote economic development (Chudnovsky 
and Lopez, 2002; South Center, 1997; Kolodner, 1994).
4 
 
4.  African Barriers to FDI 
 
As a direct result of these historical and political issues, African governments have 
constructed a series of barriers to foreign entry.  The notion that Africans needed to seize 
control of their economies after independence manifested themselves in several ways that 
continue to affect foreign investment.  Even though early concerns were directed at large 
European and small South Asian investors
5, the more recent influx of investment from East 
Asian (Brautigam, 2003) and South African investors (Daniel, et al, 2003) has helped to 
sustain some of these issues. 
 
Economic nationalism was used to justify extensive state intervention in the economy, 
including the creation of parastatals, heavy regulation, and often nationalization or 
expropriation (Kobrin, 1984).  Although these affected both local and foreign firms, many of 
the largest exporting firms had been foreign owned and operated and intervention was 
directly targeted at them.  Many of the nationalized companies have of course since returned 
to foreign private ownership, such as Ghana’s Ashanti Goldfields and the Tanzania Cigarette 
Company which were both nationalized in the 1960s and then privatized in the mid 1990s 
(although governments retain substantial minority stakes in each).  Nevertheless, the threat of 
expropriation remains ever-present.  As we will argue below, even where privatization has 
been actively pursued, governments have also tended to continue to play a strong 
interventionist role in the economy, impacting the business environment in direct and indirect 
ways.   
                                                 
4 Two other common criticisms of FDI not addressed here are the impact on environmental management and 
indigenous people (e.g., see Oxfam, 2003a). See Grabel (1995) for an attack on portfolio investment for 
constraining the ability of governments to set national priorities and Moss (2003, Chapter 6) for a rebuttal.  
5 Throughout East Africa many Africans of Asian descent are still considered “foreigners” and when officials 
speak of “foreign capital”, they are at times referring to minority local investors (Himbara, 1993).  There is a 
large literature on minority entrepreneurs in Africa (e.g., Winder, 1962; Brennan, 1999; Mengistae, 2001; 
Vandenberg, 2003; in the popular press see Sowell, 1992; Kotkin, 1994).  Although many of the measures taken 
or biases against foreigners are also directed at minority groups, for the purposes of this paper “foreign” is 
considered a citizenship rather than racial issue. 
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Second, there was, and in many countries continues to be, a deliberate policy of 
Africanization, whereby state intervention is justified in order to transfer ownership of firms 
from foreigners (or indigenous minorities) to locals (e.g., Adedeji, 1981; Boone, 1993).  In its 
most extreme cases this can be accomplished through widespread and violent expropriation, 
such as Uganda under Idi Amin or more recently commercial farms in Zimbabwe. But many 
countries, including Kenya and Zambia, pursued less violent but nonetheless explicit forms 
of encouraging ownership transfer to locals.  This policy continues in some forms today, 
especially with privatization, which tends to include special dispensations to encourage local 
ownership through legal biases or awarding bids or through share set-asides or discounts 
(Craig, 2002).  
 
Third, there are direct de jure barriers to foreign participation in the economy. Explicit legal 
restrictions on foreigners have diminished substantially as economic reform and 
liberalization has been implemented, but some limitations still exist.  Most obviously, most 
African stock markets have legal limits on the amount of equity owned by non-resident 
foreigners (Moss, 2003).  Although this mostly affects portfolio investors, any share above 
10 percent is considered FDI, so this is a direct limitation for any publicly listed company 
and a potential reason not to list on the local exchange. 
 
Many African countries still have restricted sectors in which foreigners are not allowed to 
own businesses. In some cases, this is tied directly to parastatal monopolies, so liberalization 
has occurred alongside privatization, but not always.  Ethiopia legally excludes foreigners 
from the financial sector, and Tanzania only allowed foreign bank entry since the early 
1990s.  Ghana, which has undergone significant liberalization since beginning economic 
reform two decades ago, still bars foreigners from certain trading and services sectors.   
 
Many countries have legal requirements for (or have given officials wide discretionary 
powers to add) performance requirements, such as local employment, local partnership or 
local inputs.  Concerns over protecting these conditions led to considerable African (and 
NGO) resistance to reforms aimed at universalizing national treatment or limiting the ability 
to impose certain requirements, such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment and more 
recently at the WTO (Graham, 2000).  Oxfam, for example, claims that a WTO agreement on 
investment could be “disastrous” (2003a).  ActionAid (2003) also warns against including 
investment in multilateral trade negotiations because, “Developing countries need to regulate 
investment in order to protect sensitive sectors from liberalisation and to maximise the 
positive benefits for poor people. Yet it is precisely these measures which would be 
threatened by a WTO investment agreement because host governments would be restricted in 
their ability to regulate in favour of the poor.” The overall effect is that, despite the trend of 
investment liberalization and privatization throughout much of Africa, there are still 
substantial lingering legal biases against foreign investment in many countries.   
 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there are a range of indirect obstacles related to the 
business climate that acts as de facto barriers to FDI.
6  Morisset (2000) and Basu and 
                                                 
6 There is a rich literature on the determinants of FDI, looking at a range of variables, such as income, 
infrastructure, labor costs, taxes, openness, and political stability.  Singh and Jun (1995), for example, find that 
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Srinivasan (2002) found that certain African countries have been able to attract FDI, not 
because of natural resources, but through a broad improvement in the business environment 
and deliberate image-enhancing campaigns.
7  Although most African countries have 
undertaken substantial economic reform, Asiedu (2003b) finds that the decline in African 
FDI as a ratio of total FDI is partly because improvements in policy environment have not 
been large relative to reforms in other regions. In addition, Africa has been especially prone 
to “partial reform syndrome”, where many reforms are only partially implemented or where 
only parts of a basket of policy changes are pursued, undermining the intended effect 
(Gordon, 1993; van de Walle, 2001).   
 
Indirect barriers typically include bureaucratic and other informal impediments to foreign 
investment, such as ambiguous regulatory approval, delays in customs clearance, visas for 
expatriate workers, or weaknesses in the legal system.  Many of these barriers are captured in 
the broader business climate, affect domestic firms as well, and could be considered 
unintentional.  However, these factors are different for foreign firms in two important ways.  
Data from the RPED investment climate assessments suggest that foreign firms face 
dissimilar environmental constraints than domestic firms (see below), which implies that 
public policy actions to remedy these problems could be inherently biased for or against 
foreign firms.   
 
Critically, it is also not always clear that such barriers are in fact unintentional, but rather are 
used as deliberate impediments to foreign entry or operation.  Political economists have 
frequently found that excess bureaucracy, erratic economic policy, and other problems 
associated with weak business environments have strong political logic (Bates, 1981; Lewis, 
1996; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; van de Walle, 2001).  Because political elites and business 
elites are typically allied in Africa (or, often, are one in the same), foreign investors could 
threaten market positions of privileged domestic firms.  Indeed, inefficient industries and 
policies have often been a good source of rents for the state or for particular individuals.  
Monopolistic positions by influential businessmen, political leaders, or their families are 
frequently threatened by foreign competition.  Much of the nationalist resistance to 
liberalization, including worries of foreign domination or the displacement of local firms, has 
narrow rent-seeking roots, designed to benefit certain people or groups. In this way, 
clearance of investment projects may be rejected out of the “national interest” or imported 
equipment may be inexplicably delayed or lost, but in practice this is used to protect 
politically connected competitors.  Tangri concludes, “…the political nature of the state-
foreign business relations is an important reason why sub-Saharan Africa has failed to attract 
much foreign direct investment since independence.” (1999, p. 14) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
export-orientation is a large attraction for FDI.  Goldsborough et al (1996) emphasize macroeconomic stability 
and reforms.  For an overview of the various studies that use cross-country regressions to identify country 
characteristics, see Table 3 in Asiedu (2001). 
7 Morisset found this was true for Mali and Mozambique. Basu and Srinivasan found this for Mozambique and 
Uganda. 
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5.  Foreign Investment in East Africa:  Background 
 
Given this context, we turn now to three cases studies in East Africa:  Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda.  Each of these countries has seen a recent improvement in FDI flows (see Figure 2) 
and each is undergoing some process of policy reform and liberalization.   None has any 
meaningful oil-related foreign investment, but Tanzania’s recent inflow surge has been 
largely driven by greenfield investment in its rapidly growing gold mining sector.   
 
 
Figure 2:  FDI to East Africa 










































Source: UNCTAD FDI database 
 
Each of the three countries has been substantially affected by its colonial experience and 
suffered post-independence traumas of some kind that affect their present attitudes toward 
foreign investment.  All three are former British colonies, although mainland Tanzania was 
German prior to World War I.  Kenya was designated a settler colony and had a substantial 
European business and farmer class, whereas Tanzania and Uganda were managed under 
indirect colonial rule and thus had smaller European populations.  All three countries have 
significant populations of South Asian origin that date to the colonial period.    
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Kenya.  After independence, Kenya chose to align with the West in the Cold War.  Although 
ostensibly allied with market capitalism, in practice the government followed a statist 
strategy that increasingly deteriorated into narrow rent-seeking and corruption.  Partially 
because of the large colonial settler population, there was a substantial foreign presence in 
the country, much of which remained after independence.  Large foreign banks, for instance, 
have continued operations.  For the most part, legal barriers to foreigner investment have 
been minimal.  Kenya officially encourages foreign investment and grants national treatment 
to foreign investors (WTO, 2000). Nevertheless, Kenya’s political elites believed “reliance 
on external actors was…potentially unreliable, economically risky, and most importantly, 
politically unacceptable” (Himbara, 1994, p. 470).  The government therefore used state 
enterprises to deliberately promote African entrepreneurs at the expense of both foreign and 
local Asian investors (Jaffee, 1992; Himbara, 1993, 1994; Holmquist, 2002).  At times anti-
foreigner sentiment, fuelled by government officials, led to violence, including widespread 
looting of Asian-owned businesses in the early 1980s.  There are also legal restrictions on 
equity investors, with foreign investors capped at 40 percent of Nairobi stock exchange listed 
companies. 
 
More broadly, there has been wide regulatory discretion, with significant informal biases 
against foreign firms and minority-owned firms.  Over time, the deteriorating business 
environment, especially poor governance, growing corruption, and more recently crime, has 
contributed substantially to low inflows of FDI.  Despite its western-orientation and 
rhetorical commitment to capitalism, Kenya has not been immune to some of the nationalist-
populist arguments against foreign investors.  Parliamentarian Stephen Ndicho, waving a 
copy of the constitution, recently declared, "This document says Kenya is a sovereign state, 
but we are not and we now live at the mercy of these multinationals"  (quoted in The Nation, 
December 7, 2000). Another MP Mirugi Kariuki recently implored the government to "chase 
away any investor who perceives Kenya as a place where cheap labor is available and whose 
intention is to exploit workers with impunity" (quoted in The Monitor, June 26, 2003). 
  
Kenya’s current business environment is in flux following the defeat of KANU in December 
2002, ending its nearly four decades in power.  The new government of President Mwai 
Kibaki is thought to be reformist, and ran on an anti-corruption platform.  In theory, this 
should benefit foreign investors as the government tackles one of the most prominent barriers 
to greater inflows.  However, the new ruling coalition also has its anti-foreigner tendencies.  
In the late 1960s Kenya’s official campaign of discriminating against Asian businessmen in 
favor of indigenous Africans was led by a then-obscure commerce minister, Mwai Kibaki 
(Himbara, 1994).  Raila Odinga—currently a cabinet minister, but also a possible successor 
to Kibaki and the leading candidate to become prime minister if proposed constitutional 
changes are implemented—has anti-FDI leanings.  In 1999, he suggested that Kenya was 
receiving too much FDI rather than too little, claiming, “the government must protect local 
industries against undue competition from multinationals to speed up industrialization… no 
country could industrialize with foreign investment alone” (quoted in The Nation April 22, 
1999).   
 
Tanzania.  Tanzania under Julius Nyerere attempted a socialist transformation that saw 
widespread nationalization of property, including the seizure of foreign assets.  Foreign 
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investment was legally and effectively banned.  This was widened in the 1970s to include 
most Asian-owned businesses and an (unevenly enforced) expropriation of any property 
valued at greater than $15,000.  Capitalism and foreign capital in particular were considered 
un-African, whereas ujamaa was considered more “authentic” and appropriate.
8 
 
More recently the climate has changed considerably.  Economic reforms began slowly in 
1986, and accelerated after an economic crisis in the mid 1990s, substantially altering the 
government’s stance on foreign investment.  The privatization program, which included 
many nationalized firms previously owned by foreign companies, facilitated the return of 
foreign firms back into the country.  Mining reforms in the early 1990s allowed major new 
investment by foreign firms, especially Ghana’s Ashanti Goldfields and South Africa’s 
AngloGold.  Foreign banks were allowed entry after 1993 and several large South African 
and British banks began operations soon thereafter.  Legal changes in 1997 lifted most of the 
remaining sectoral restrictions on foreign investment on the mainland (although many 
regulations remain in place in semi-autonomous Zanzibar).  Previous demands of 
government equity have also been lifted for all sectors, except for petroleum (UNCTAD, 
2002).  Otherwise, foreign investors are mostly afforded national treatment, including 
protection of fiscal incentives, guarantee of repatriation, and importation of expatriate staff.  
Remaining legal biases are relatively minor, such as the minimum capital investment to 
qualify for approval is three times the local requirement. 
 
Despite the reforms and increased inflows, there is residual resentment against foreign 
capital.  For Tanzania we have specific evidence of skepticism toward foreign capital.  Solid 
polling data on such attitudes is unusual in Africa, but a poll conducted by Michigan State 
University in 2001 asked specifically about whether the government should encourage 
foreign investment or “be wary of foreigners because they may gain control of our national 
wealth”.  Two-thirds felt the latter, with 57% strongly so; just 23% strongly agreed that 
government should encourage foreign investment (Afrobarometer, 2003).
9  
 
Other indicators of attitude toward foreign capital also suggest doubt.  The stock exchange 
operated for its first three years with a complete ban on foreign participation.  Only in 2003 
did it allow non-resident foreigner to buy shares, and only up to 60 percent of total equity.  
Africanization continues officially, although implementation has been piecemeal.  The 
privatization program did not overtly penalize foreign firm bids, but there were special 
financing terms for local investors buying smaller firms.  Although there are no blanket legal 
requirements for local partners, officials have hinted that such a provision was possible.  Iddi 
Simba, then Minister for Trade and Commerce, said, “Foreign companies which want to 
invest in Tanzania will be compelled to identify local partners. If they cannot do so, the 
government will help them identify partners because we are now aiming at localising and 
                                                 
8 The closest translation of the Swahili word ujamaa is “family”, but Nyerere and others used it as a synonym 
for his concept of “African socialism”. 
9 The Afrobarometer is a joint project of The Institute for Democracy in South Africa, Ghana Centre for 
Democratic Development, and Michigan State University, which polls attitudes on democracy and markets in 
Africa.  They polled in Uganda in 2000, but did not include this specific question on foreign investors.  They 
have not polled in Kenya.  Aggregate data for 12 countries is scheduled for release later in 2004. 
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promoting local participation in investments." (quoted in The East African,  February 18, 
1999). 
 
On the business environment, bureaucracy also remains a problem.  Most of the current 
officials and bureaucrats were trained during socialist times and the reflex has been to over-
regulate and resist ceding control.  For example, one privatized manufacturing firm was 
under investigation after it tried to lease some of its space because its business plan did not 
include real estate transactions (Temu and Due, 1998).  The Tanzanian public has also 
retained some of its old reservations.  Despite the large inflows of mining investment, even 
the business press has complained.  For example, the Business Times recently asked:   
 
… what is the percentage of the so-called 'economic contribution' of the 
mining companies to Tanzania vis-à-vis what they are reaping from their 
operations under decidedly lopsided agreements? True, the sector has grown 
rapidly since 1997. But, for whom has it been growing, pray? How much has 
Tanzania as a nation-state, and its impoverished people, gained from that 
growth? … it is an officially sanctioned rape of Tanzania's mineral wealth 
(September 26, 2003). 
 
Uganda.  Uganda has seen the most extreme swings in sentiment toward foreigners.  Idi 
Amin nationalized foreign businesses and in 1972 forcibly expelled 80,000 Asians.  His 
successor Milton Obote was little better.  However, the government of Yoweri Museveni, 
which came to power in 1986, began one of Africa’s most wide-ranging economic reform 
programs, re-opening the economy to foreign investment.  In the 1990s Museveni actively 
sought foreign investment and successfully invited Asians back to the country to reclaim lost 
property. 
 
Ironically, Uganda’s investment code is technically restrictive on foreigners, insisting on a 
license that could be denied for any number of ambiguous reasons, including anything 
deemed “contrary to the interests of Uganda”.  In practice, however, the licensing process has 
become automatic and the national interest clause has never been formally invoked against a 
prospective foreign investor (UNCTAD, 2000).  The only restricted sector is agriculture, 
although agro-processing has been allowed and the cabinet has approved some exceptions in 
the case of foreign investment in tea estates.  Privatization has also encouraged foreign 
investment in a range of sectors.  Uganda opened a stock market in 1999 with no restrictions 
of any kind on foreigners.   
 
Despite the general openness in Uganda, performance requirements can be imposed on 
foreigners.  For any business majority-owned by foreigners, officials have legal rights to 
impose employment, local input, or technology conditions on the license.  There are also 
minor biases against foreign firms in finance as the central bank may impose restrictions on 
access to domestic credit, and foreign-owned banks and insurance companies are subject to 
higher capital requirements.  Foreign investors are also allowed leasehold on land, but are not 
permitted freehold land title.   
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6.  Foreign Investment in East Africa:  New Results from Firm Surveys 
 
In this context, the results of a new firm-level investment climate database from the World 
Bank’s Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) are illuminating.  The firm 
surveys, which cover between 300 and 400 manufacturing firms of various size, classes, and 
types of ownership in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, were undertaken during the period 
2002-03. A series of variables describe various characteristics of firms including the inputs 
and outputs of the production process, access to finance, wages and other characteristics of 
workers, and types of technology and learning in the firm.  The surveys also measure the 
amount of foreign equity in each firm surveyed.
10  Two key results emerge:  (a) foreign firms 
often operate in a very difficult business environment and (b) despite the obstacles they face, 
they are more productive and invest more in the production than do domestic firms.  The 
overall results suggest that foreign direct investment brings many of the claimed benefits, 
including some of those specifically challenged by critics.   
 
Let us begin by looking at the business environment that faces firms operating in Uganda, 
Kenya, and Tanzania.  We see that both foreign and domestic firms face several constraints 
that impede their day-to-day operations (Table 2).   Apart from the somewhat predictable 
complaints about the cost of finance and tax rates, firms complain about macroeconomic 
instability, the availability of reliable electric power, corruption, tax administration, and 
crime.  A higher proportion of foreign firms complain about corruption in all three countries, 
suggesting that foreign firms bear a greater burden of non-official payments, or at least are 
more sensitive to their prevalence.   
 
                                                 
10 The World Bank’s Regional Program on Enterprise Development, based in the Africa Private Sector Group, 
has conducted firm-level surveys in Africa for over a decade.  In recent years, a new round of African data has 
been collected as part of the Bank-wide Investment Climate Initiative.  In the past two years, firm surveys have 
been conducted in Mozambique, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.  Surveys are currently 
underway in South Africa, Lesotho, Mauritius, Madagascar, Senegal and Mali.   More information on these 
surveys and the survey methodology is available at www.worldbank.org/rped or 
www.worldbank.org/privatesector.   
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Table 2:  Business Environment in East Africa 
 
Respondents' Evaluation of General Constraints to Operation 
% of firms evaluating constraint as "major" or "very severe" 
   Uganda  Tanzania  Kenya 
   Foreign  Domestic Foreign  Domestic Foreign  Domestic
 Corruption  55  33  58  50  81  72 
 Macroeconomic Instability   58  41  51  41  49  52 
 Regulatory Policy Uncertainty  38  24  27  33  60  52 
 Customs and Trade Regulations  38  23  36  30  45  41 
 Crime, theft and disorder  37  24  18  27  73  71 
  Access  to  Land  25 16 18 26 23 24 
 Tax administration  42  35  58  55  47  53 
 Electricity  49 43 67 57 53 47 
 Anti-competitive or informal practices  34  30  29  23  72  62 
  Telecommunications  6  5  11 12 67 40 
 Transportation  29  21  24  22  54  38 
 Cost of Financing (e.g. interest rates)  54  62  48  60  66  77 
 Tax rates  43  50  78  72  55  69 
 Access to Financing (e.g. collateral)  37  48  35  52  36  49 
 Skills & Education of Available Workers 25  32  24  25  31  27 
  Labor  Regulations  12 10 22 10 17 24 
 Business Licensing & Operating Permits 13  9  22  28  13  17 
Source:  World Bank, RPED 
 
Looking at the case of Uganda in more detail, the uncertainty in the business environment is 
of concern to both local and foreign-owned firms.  Corruption is of greater concern to foreign 
firms; they pay almost 4 percent of revenues in informal payments compared to less than 2 
percent for domestic firms (Table 3).  The data indicate that between 4 and 20 percent of 
respondents make a nonofficial payment for telephone connections, electrical connections, 
construction permits, and import and trading licenses.  Finally, it is interesting to note that 
foreign firms are able to compensate to a greater extent for poor services than local firms 
(Table 4).  Both foreign and domestic firms experienced about 40 power outages in the year 
preceding the survey.  However, foreign firms are able to offset these losses to some extent.  
About 68 percent of foreign firms have their own generators and 28 percent have a well, 
compared to 26 percent and 9 percent respectively for domestic firms.  
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Table 3: Corruption in Uganda 
(all percentages as reported by respondents) 






























































Percent of revenues that are needed for informal payments? 2.4  1.1 2.6  3.9  1.9  3.0  2.3 
Percent Saying Gift/Payment Required for:         
a) A mainline telephone connection  18.3  28.6 16.4  18.4  18.5  18.2  17.6 
b) An electrical connection  21.5  21.4 21.5  18.2  22.3  24.0  21.2 
c) A construction permit  12.3  20.0 11.1  10.0  13.2  5.6  14.8 
d) An import license  3.6  0.0 4.3  5.3  2.8  0.0  4.5 
e) Trading license  4.2 3.4 4.3 3.8 4.3 2.7 4.5 
Percent of Revenue Reported for Tax Purposes  76.7 87.3 75.2 81.3 75.3 86.1 74.7 
 
 





























































Freq of power outages(times last yr)  38.6  54.2  36.5  40.3  38.0  38.3  37.7 
% of production lost due to power outages  6.3  4.5  6.5  7.4  5.9  3.7  6.7 
Have  own  generator  (%)  35.3 69.4 30.7 67.7 26.0 53.3 31.9 
Have built own well (%)  13.0  30.6  10.6  27.9  8.7  24.4  10.6 
No. of days to obtain a telephone connection33.2  23.1  35.1  17.7  39.3  35.1  32.8 
No. of days to obtain an electricity 
connection  38.3 39.1 38.3 46.8 36.2 48.7 36.6 
Source: World Bank (2004) 
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Table 5 describes the regulatory burden and administrative delays that firms face in Uganda.  
Again, it is clear that both foreign and domestic firms operate in a very difficult business 
environment.  Only 40 percent of firms in Uganda report that regulations are interpreted in a 
consistent and predictable manner.  Almost 4 percent of foreign firms report that payments 
are made to “get things done” compared to 2 percent of local firms; it can be argued that 
these estimates are downward biased but that the differential between foreign and domestic 
firms is likely accurate.  Foreign firms also spend significantly more time on inspections and 
meetings with officials (26 days per year versus 9.7 for local firms), yet report a higher 
percentage of their revenues for tax purposes. 
 





























































Interpretations of regulations consistent, predictable 
(% disagreeing)  40.0 33.3 41.0 36.4 41.0 31.1 41.4 
Percent senior management's time spent dealing 
with regulations   0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Percent revenues typically paid to officials to "get 
things done"  2.4 1.1 2.6 3.9 1.9 3.0 2.3 
Percent total firm revenues typically reported for tax 
purposes  76.7 87.3 75.2 81.3 75.3 86.1 74.7 
Inspections               
Total days spent in inspections or required meetings 
with officials (days)  13.4 25.6 11.8 26.0 9.7  18.2 12.6 
Percent of meetings/inspections by local authorities  19.4 7.6  21.4 8.9  23.0 16.3 20.1 
Total cost of fines or seized goods (% of sales)  0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Percent of interactions in which informal payment 
requested  6.7 9.4 6.3 6.8 6.7 7.3 6.6 
If yes, value? (% of sales)  0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Imports               
Avg. days to clear customs (days)  5.8 5.5 5.9 5.6 6.1 5.3 6.0 
Longest delay to clear customs (days)  11.2 10.1 11.5 12.5 9.8  10.9 11.3 
Exports               
Avg. days to clear customs (days)  3.5 4.2 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.7 
Longest delay to clear customs (days)  6.0 6.3 5.9 6.5 4.8 5.8 6.2 
Source: World Bank (2004) 
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Despite the constraints in the operating environment described above, our data indicate that 
foreign firms make a substantial contribution to the African private sector.  Foreign firms 
invest a greater share of profits back into the firm than local firms.  They report a higher 
percentage of revenue for tax purposes than do domestic firms.  Firms with foreign equity are 
also substantially larger than local firms.  Within the sample, the average foreign firm 
employs 391 workers versus 102, and this disparity held for each country, with Uganda 
showing a nearly 10 to one ratio (see Figure 3).  It is clear from these data that foreign firms 
are a very significant source of employment in Africa.   
 





















































Source: RPED               Source: RPED 
 
Foreign firms also report higher productivity; value added per worker is significantly higher 
in foreign versus local firms (Figure 4).   This may be explained by the greater managerial 
skills and experience in foreign firms (Figure 5).  More than half of the foreign firms 
reported the general manager had a university degree, but this was true in less than one-
quarter of domestic firms. The manager also reported an average of 11 years’ experience in 
foreign firms versus seven in a domestic firm, although this did not show up in Kenya.  This 
result on management skills is also potentially relevant to spillover effects as since others 
have found that experience in foreign firms is associated with higher productivity in new 
local firms started by managers after leaving the foreign firm (World Bank, 2004 on Uganda; 
Görg and Strobl, 2004 on Ghana).  
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Worker training may also be a factor.  Foreign firms are nearly twice as likely to have a 
formal training program (Figure 6).  Investments in training have been shown to produce 
large gains for African manufacturing (Biggs et al, 1995).  For firms and the economy as a 
whole, this adds to human capital, productivity, and output.  For individual workers, training 
adds to their skills. This not only offers a reason why these firms might have higher 
productivity, but also challenges the notion that foreign firms do not invest in their workers.  
Combined with the finding that foreign subsidiaries are on average three years older than 
local firms, this does not suggest mobile FDI associated with exploiting short-term low-cost 
labor.   
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The results for the likelihood of exporting are also quite different between foreign and 
domestic firms.  Foreign firms are much more likely to export their output and be able to 
purchase necessary imported inputs (Figure 7).  This suggests that foreign firms are more 
connected to global markets.  The results also show that foreign firms, although they report 
importing on average 56 percent of their inputs, rely on domestic suppliers for the other 44 
percent.  This suggests substantial linkage to the local economy although, as one might 
expect, to a lesser degree than local firms.   
 

























The survey also highlights foreign-domestic differences in their investments in infrastructure 
(Figure 8).  Eighty percent of foreign firms report owning their own generator, compared 
with less than half of local firms.  Foreign firms were also nearly twice as likely to have their 
own well or to have built their own roads.  Within each country, these patterns held, except 
for the case of roads in Tanzania, where domestic firms were more likely (11 percent versus 
9 percent).  These investments in infrastructure suggest three implications.  First, this could 
be viewed as a positive sign that companies are investing for the long-term and are 
contributing to the country’s infrastructure development.  Second, this confirms that foreign 
firms find the general business environment a significant barrier to operation.  Lastly, the 
greater relative investment also suggests that foreign firms are better capitalized to overcome 
these deficiencies than local firms. 
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Finally, it is interesting to note the differences between foreign and local firms with respect 
to health benefits (Table 6).  Foreign firms are three times more likely to provide health 
insurance in Uganda and almost twice as likely to do so in Tanzania.  Similarly, the provision 
of on-site medical care is much higher in all three countries as is accident compensation or 
insurance.  Foreign firms are also more likely to carry out pre-employment health checks 
than local firms. 
 
 
Table 6:  Health Benefits: Foreign vs. Local firms  
Percentage of firms providing benefits:  
 Uganda  Kenya  Tanzania 
  Local Foreign  Local Foreign  Local Foreign 
Health  insurance    11.1% 37.5% 45.2% 64.8% 24.8% 42.8% 
Med.  care  at  company  clinic  14.8% 59.3% 29.5% 62.2% 22.5% 48.2% 
Accident  comp/insur  23.5% 93.8% 90.4% 83.8% 62.3% 73.7% 
Other  health/med  benefit  15.4% 21.9% 40.4% 40.5% 41.8% 50.0% 
Pre-employment  check  17.3% 34.4% 29.5% 48.6% 47.1% 69.6% 
 
 
  22 
 
7.  Factors Determining Foreign Ownership:  A Simple Econometric Test 
 
The discussion thus far has examined the constraints to foreign investment in Africa and the 
differences in the behavior of foreign versus local firms. Key problems in political attitude 
and pressures, weak infrastructure, and unfavorable business environment deter foreign firms 
from locating within Sub-Saharan Africa. For firms that have chosen to locate there, we see 
that they invest more in local infrastructure, are more likely to train their workers, and are 
larger and more capital intensive than local enterprises. They also tend to have higher market 
power: they control a greater percentage of the local market for their products compared to 
local enterprises.  
 
In this section we examine the economic factors distinguishing foreign firms from local 
enterprises within a simple econometric framework. Any firm’s decision to operate is 
governed by its potential profit; foreign firms that choose to locate in Sub-Saharan Africa do 
so because they expect that despite the structural constraints, revenues from operations will 
exceed their costs.  By definition, 
 
 Profit=(P*Q- C*Q) where P= unit price, Q=quantity, C= unit cost 
 
Higher profits can be achieved by raising P through oligopolistic or monopolistic behavior, 
and/or by lowering cost C through greater efficiency. A common economic criticism of 
foreign firms has been that they enter the local markets to drive out competitors, raising 
prices and exploiting local resources. Others have argued that these firms are more efficient 
than the locals, and improve the competitive environment in their host countries.  
 
Using our East African data, we test the following hypotheses:  
 
•  Hypothesis I: Foreign firms exercise strong market power by creating local 
monopolies and crowding out domestic investment—i.e. the "economy will be in the 
hands of foreigners".  This hypothesis is tested in our model by using a measure of 
market share.  
 
•  Hypothesis II: Foreign firms are profitable because they are more productive. This is 
measured by labor productivity, VA/L, managerial education, and worker training 
variables. 
 
•  Hypothesis III:  An additional hypothesis that is tested.  Some argue that FDI is a 
drain on foreign exchange, because foreign firms are more likely to use imported raw 
materials.  We test this by including the percentage of raw materials imported in our 
model.  We also include the percentage of output exported. 
 
The model used is a Probit, measuring the likelihood of a firm being a foreign enterprise.  
We try two specifications for the left hand side variable—the first examines the 
distinguishing characteristics between foreign and local firms, where foreign firms are 
defined as those which have any foreign equity. In the second specification, we define 
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foreign firms as only those with majority foreign equity—i.e. where foreign equity is greater 
than 50 percent.  
 
The explanatory variables in our econometric model include the following:  
 
Lwork: Log of total workers employed by the firm (capturing the firm size effect)  
Mktsh: Percentage of industry output for the product that is supplied by the firm  
Pctexp: Percentage of total output exported  
Pctimp: Percentage of total raw materials imported  
Unived: A 1/0 dummy, 1 if the manager has a university degree  
Train: A 1/0 dummy, 1 if the firm has a training program for its workers  
LVal: Log of Value Added per worker, measuring labor productivity  
Kenya: Country dummy for Kenya, Uganda is the excluded category  
Tanzan: Country dummy for Tanzania; Uganda is the excluded category  
 
The dependent variable a 0/1 variable that is set to 1 in Model 1 if the firm has any foreign 
equity and is set to 1 in Model 2 if the firm has more than 50 percent foreign equity.  The 
results are presented below:  
 
Table 7: Probit Results on Foreign Ownership  
 
Variable  Model 1  
(Fgn if equity > 0)  
Model II 
(Fgn if equity > 50)  








































N 301  301 
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As expected, we see that foreign firms are significantly larger than local enterprises. After 
controlling for firm size, we see that the two other key factors distinguishing foreign firms 
from locals are percentage exported and labor productivity. Foreign firms, even within the 
same size class, are more likely to export their products than local firms (hence bringing in 
foreign exchange; the import dummy is insignificant) and have a more productive labor force 
indicating greater efficiency. The market share variable is not significant, indicating that 
market power is not the key driving force for greater profits for these firms.   Thus, we reject 




8.  Conclusion 
 
Foreign investment can play an important role in developing countries.  African countries 
have, for the most part, not received much FDI.  At least part of this poor performance is 
owing to deep-seated sentiments against foreign capital reinforced by political factors that 
militate against FDI. These factors have manifested themselves in many ways, including a 
range of business environment factors that impede greater foreign flows.  Although much of 
the ideological resistance has faded, a number of specific challenges to the purported benefits 
of FDI have been successful in preventing more active liberalization and in moving to deal 
with indirect barriers. Data from firm surveys in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda suggest that 
there are important positive effects from FDI for both the host economies and the workers in 
foreign-owned firms.  Based on our three-country sample, foreign firms are more productive, 
bring management skills, invest more heavily in infrastructure and in the training and health 
of their workers, and are more connected to global markets.  At the same time, they do not 
appear to succeed by grabbing market share and crowding out local industry.  These results 
suggest that many of the objections to foreign investment are exaggerated or false.  Africa, 
by not attracting more FDI, is therefore failing to fully benefit from the potential of foreign 
capital to contribute to economic development and integration with the global economy. 
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